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3University of QueenslandTwo-parameter representations of preferences under uncertainty, such as mean-variance
preferences (Tobin 1958, Markowitz 1959), are naturally appealing. Most importantly, they
correspond directly to the natural interpretation of choice under uncertainty as a trade-o be-
tween risk and expected return. Such preferences also yield relatively tractable comparative-
static analysis and form the basis of the highly successful capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
(Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965).
Quiggin and Chambers (2004) derive conditions under which preferences can be charac-
terized in terms of a preference function with two arguments, the mean and an index of risk
that is sublinear (positively linearly homogeneous and subadditive) in deviations from that
mean. The best-known example of such a risk index is the standard deviation, which gives
rise to mean-variance preferences. However, more general risk indexes, incorporating, for
example, skewness and higher moments may also be represented in this form. Thus, because
investors seem to display a preference for skewness, this extended class of models potentially
solves an important problem that is frequently associated with mean-variance preferences.
The central idea of Quiggin and Chambers (2004) is to replace concepts of constant
absolute and relative risk aversion, dened over the stochastic return space, with the less
demanding requirement that rankings of equal-mean random variables are unaected by
radial expansions and by translations in the direction of the constant act. The concepts
of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion correspond exactly to
the imposition of translation homotheticity and radial homotheticity, respectively, upon the
preference functional over stochastic outcomes. Quiggin and Chambers (2004) generalize
by imposing these properties only over equal-mean returns. They refer to such preferences
as invariant, and show that they can be characterized by preferences over the mean and a
risk index. However, because the probability measure determining the mean is exogenously
given in this framework, invariant preferences necessarily presume the existence of a known
(unique) probability measure.
In reality, however, there is considerable disagreement over the probabilities of relevant
events, and many decisionmakers may not possess well-dened probability distributions over
events. Evidence comes from both the market place, where, for example, experts can dier
widely in their assessment of the probabilities of common market events such as recessions,
1and from the laboratory, where empirical evidence rather routinely questions the existence of
probablistically sophisticated preferences. In particular, it appears doubtful that beliefs can
be represented by probabilities derived from historical relative frequencies, as is standard in
empirical applications of mean-variance theory. In the literature on choice under uncertainty,
situations of this kind are commonly analyzed in terms of ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961).
There have been very many contributions to this literature. Maccheroni, Marinacci and
Rustichini (2006) presented a model of variational preferences, in which preferences are
characterized by a utility function u on outcomes and an ambiguity index c on the set of
probabilities on the states of the world. Preferences of the kind described by Maccheroni,
Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) can satisfy the translation invariance property of Quiggin
and Chambers (2004). The relationship between the two models is explored further by Grant
and Polak (2007).
In this paper, we generalize the model of Quiggin and Chambers (2004) to allow for
ambiguity, and derive conditions, referred to as generalized invariance, under which a two-
argument representation of preferences may be obtained independent of the existence of
a unique probability measure. The rst of these two arguments inherits the properties of
standard means, namely, that they are upper semi-continuous, translatable and positively
linearly homogeneous. But instead of being additive, these generalized means are superad-
ditive. Superadditivity allows for means that are computed (conservatively) with respect to
a set of prior probability measures rather than a singleton probability measure. The second
argument of the preference structure is a further generalization of the risk index derived
in Quiggin and Chambers (2004). It is sublinear in deviations from the generalized mean
discussed above.
The paper is organized as follows. After setting up the notation, we state axioms that
give rise to a generalized model of uncertainty with multiple priors. The axioms are weaker
than those of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Next, we show that these preference give rise
to the generalized invariance property, and derive a representation theorem that yields a
two-parameter representation of preferences. Finally, we show how the two-parameter repre-
sentation can be used to provide tractable concepts of comparative aversion to uncertainty as
well as a very tractable analytic framework upon which to base comparative-static analysis,
2even in the absence of well-dened subjective probabilities.
1 Notation and background
The stochastic setting is modelled by a measurable space, 
 = (S;); where S represents
the set of states of Nature and  represents an algebra of measurable events. Probability
measures on  are denoted by  2  where  is the probability simplex. Preferences are
dened over acts, represented by measurable mappings from S to a space X of consequences,
where X  RM: X is assumed to be an unbounded, closed, convex cone that contains the
origin, 0 2 RM.
A random variable, ~ f; can be thought of as the element of XS dened by
~ f = [f (s) : s 2 S];
where f : S ! X is the measurable map dening the random variable. We adopt the
standard abuse of notation by which, for any x 2 X; we also let x denote the constant act
such that
x(s) = x; 8s 2 S:
The set of all measurable mappings f : S ! X is denoted F.
2 Axioms
We assume the existence of a preference ordering  on F with properties described by the
axioms given below. The asymmetric and symmetric components of the preference ordering
are denoted, respectively,  and . The preference ordering  on F induces an ordering on






 2  : 




% is the set of priors for which the standard mean generated by the given prior for each
act is at least weakly preferred to the act itself. Hence, 
% corresponds intuitively to the
3set of priors (possibly empty) for which the decisionmaker is risk averse in its usual sense.
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may not be a singleton, but










is the least preferred mean
value of the act ~ f generated from 
%: Hence, it has a straightforward interpretation as a
generalized mean value. If 






We impose the following properties on :
Axiom 1 A.1 Weak order: If ~ f; ~ g;~ h 2 F then
(a) either ~ f  ~ g or ~ g  ~ f (completeness)
(b) ~ f  ~ g and ~ g  ~ h ) ~ f  ~ h:
Axiom 2 A.2 Continuity: If ~ f; ~ g;~ h 2 F;x 2 X; the sets
n




 2 [0;1] : ~ h  ~ g + (1   )x
o
are closed.
Axiom 3 A.3 Monotonicity: If ~ f; ~ g 2 F and f (s) X g (s);8s 2 S; then ~ f  ~ g. If
f (s) X g (s);8s 2 S; then ~ f  ~ g:
Axiom 4 A.4 Uncertainty aversion: If ~ f; ~ g 2 F and  2 (0;1)
~ f  ~ g )  ~ f + (1   ) ~ g  ~ f:
Axiom 5 A.5 Non-degeneracy: ~ f  ~ g for some ~ f; ~ g












~ f  ~ g ,  ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x:
A.1 to A.6 ensure that 
% is closed (A.2), convex (A.1 and A.4), and non-empty (oth-
erwise A.6 would give rise to a contradiction). In what follows, for the sake of a compact










4Except for A.6., which we have labelled equal-mean certainty independence, these prop-
erties are the same as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rus-
tichini (2006). Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) version of certainty independence requires for
x 2 X;  2 (0;1); and ~ f; ~ g 2 F
~ f  ~ g ,  ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x
Thus, A.6 is strictly weaker than the corresponding axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) by




  (~ g): While A.6 is strictly weaker
than the corresponding axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler, it still has important consequences.
For example,
Lemma 7 If preferences satisfy A:1 and A:6, for x;y;z 2 X,  2 (0;1);
x  y , x + (1   )z  y + (1   )z:
Lemma 7, which Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preferences also satisfy, has a number
of implications. First, by taking  = 1
2 it establishes that, for constant acts, preferences
satisfying our axioms also satisfy the Herstein and Milnor (1953) axioms for the existence of
an ane utility structure that maps X to the reals. Second, by taking z to be either x or
y; it implies that indierence surfaces are linear over constant acts. Moreover, because we
explicitly assume 0 2 X; Lemma 7 implies for x;y 2 X, and  > 0 that
x  y , x  y:
Preferences over constant acts must be radially homothetic with linear indierence surfaces.
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) adopt an alternative weakening of the
Gilboa{Schmeidler certainty-independence axiom, namely that for all ~ f; ~ g 2 F; x;y 2 X
and  2 (0;1]
 ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x )  ~ f + (1   )y  ~ g + (1   )y
It can be shown (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini 2006)) that Gilboa and Schmeidler's
(1989) certainty-independence axiom can be recast as follows for all x;y 2 X; ; 2 (0;1]
and ~ f; ~ g 2 F:
 ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x )  ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x:
5Hence, as Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) put it, the Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) independence axiom requires two forms of preference independence: independence
when mixing with constant acts, and independence with respect to the mixing parameter.1
Their reformulation retains independence when mixing with constant acts, but not inde-
pendence with respect to the mixing parameter. Our version of certainty independence
requires independence when mixing random acts possessing indierent generalized means
with constant acts as well as independence with respect to the mixing parameter (again over
indierent generalized means).
2.1 Utility space
Under the stated assumptions, the analysis may be undertaken in utility space. We have
Lemma 8 If preferences satisfy A.1{A.6, there exists a utility function u : X ! R such
that: u(tx) = tu(x); t > 0; u(x)  u(y) , x  y; and u(x + y) = u(x) + u(y):
Note that this is slightly stronger than the corresponding result in Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) because our assumptions ensure that X contains the origin, so that with an
appropriate normalization, u is linear rather than merely ane.
Given a utility function u : X ! R; representing ; there is an induced mapping from
F to U  RS, where
U =
n
~ u 2 R
S : ~ u = u  ~ f; ~ f 2 F
o
:





 u  ~ f








: Conversely, the original preference
relation over F induces a unique preference relationship over U, which with a minor abuse





 ~ u(~ g) , ~ f  ~ g:
1Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2005) elaborate on the role that certainty independence plays
in the separation of beliefs and tastes for general preference structures.
6Thus, axiom A.2 has a natural interpretation in utility space. More generally, the proper-
ties A.1{A.6 are inherited by  over U: Given the existence of a well-dened utility function
and a generalized mean, the analysis of the properties of preferences may be undertaken in
utility space. Denote by ~ 1 2 RS the unit vector with all entries equal to 1.
The generalized mean  : F ! X; by Lemma 8, induces a corresponding generalized










































































can be recognized as the (lower) support function for the closed, convex set

%. Hence, it is upper semi-continuous, positively linearly homogeneous, and superadditive
in ~ u: It also satises  (~ u + ) =  (~ u) + :
3 Generalized invariance and multiple priors
In this section, we show that preferences satisfying Axioms A.1 to A.6 satisfy a generalized
version of the Quiggin and Chambers (2004) notion of invariance, which we refer to as
generalized invariant preferences. We characterize that notion geometrically in terms of the
preference maps showing that it is equivalent to imposing both constant risk aversion and
constant relative risk aversion across indierent mean returns. This geometric discussion
emphasizes the role that restrictions on preference maps over stochastic outcomes play in
inducing small parameter representations of preferences. Dene
V (~ u) = f~ u
0 2 U : ~ u
0  ~ ug:
Lemma 9 Under Axioms A.1 to A.6. V (~ u) satises:
1. (a) Either ~ u0 2 V (~ u) or ~ u 2 V (~ u0); (b) ~ u0  ~ u , V (~ u0)  V (~ u);
2. V (~ u) is closed;
3. ~ u0  ~ u ) V (~ u0)  V (~ u);
74. if ~ u0  ~ u; ~ u0 + (1   ) ~ u 2 V (~ u) for  2 (0;1);
5. V (~ u) has non-empty interior for some ~ u;
6.  (~ u) 2 V (~ u) for all ~ u 2 U; and
7. for  (~ u)   (~ u0);  2 R; and  2 (0;1); ~ u0 2 V (~ u) , ~ u0 + (1   ) 2
V (~ u + (1   )):
Upon dening,
M ()  f~ u 2 F : 
 (~ u)  g;
K (~ u)  V (~ u) \ M (
 (~ u));
Lemma 9 immediately gives
Proposition 10 Under Axioms A.1 to A.6, preferences satisfy:
i) generalized radial invariance
K (t~ u) = tK (~ u);t > 0;
ii) generalized multiplicative spread invariance
K (~ u + (1   )
(~ u)) = K (~ u) + (1   )
(~ u)~ 1;  2 (0;1); and
iii) generalized translation invariance
K (~ u + ) = K (~ u) + ~ 1;  2 <:
Proposition 10 demonstrates that preferences satisfying Axioms A.1 to A.6 satisfy the
natural extension of Quiggin and Chambers (2004) concept of invariant preferences that
replaces a mean calculated with a singleton prior with : Thus, we shall refer to preferences
satisfying the conditions in Proposition 10 as being generalized invariant in what follows.
4 Representation theorem
We now show that generalized invariant preferences admit a simple two-parameter repre-
sentation. The primary argument in favor of two-parameter representations of preferences,
8such as the mean-variance framework, is the analytic tractability oered by a simple decom-
position of preferences into a pure wealth component (the mean) and a pure risk component
(the variance). A similar degree of tractability only became available in expected-utility
models when notions of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion
were developed.
Geometrically, both constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion can
be visualized as imposing dierent types of homotheticity on preference maps over stochastic
outcomes. Hence, basic consumer and producer theory teach us that, even in the absence
of the strong separability assumptions implied by expected utility theory, these restrictions
oer a tremendous amount of analytic tractability (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). When
imposed jointly, constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion require
that preferences over stochastic outcomes assume the Gilboa{Schmeidler (1989) form with
a linear utility structure (Safra and Segal, 1998; Quiggin and Chambers, 1998).
Choose x;y 2 X so that, for ~ f 2 F and s 2 S; x  ~ f (s)  y: By A:2; a standard
argument reveals there exists an  2 [0;1] such that
x + (1   )y  ~ f:
Hence, for any act ~ f, there exists a certainty equivalent cf 2 X yielding a certainty-equivalent
utility of u(cf):
We now characterize that certainty-equivalent utility. Dene the benet function (Luen-
berger, 1992)
B (~ u;V ) = maxf 2 R : ~ u    2 V g;
if there is some  2 R such that ~ u  2 V and 1 otherwise. B (~ u;V ) is a complete function











, ~ u  ~ u
0:
That ~ u 2 V (~ u0) ) B (~ u;V (~ u0))  0 follows by construction, while Lemma 9.3 implies
~ u  ~ u   B (~ u;V (~ u0)) 2 V (~ u0) if B (~ u;V (~ u0))  0:2
2One can also show, for example, that B is concave and nondecreasing in ~ u under our axioms.
9By construction V 0  V implies B (~ u;V )  B (~ u;V 0) because ~ u   B (~ u;V 0) 2 V 0  V .
The benet function thus gives the certainty equivalent utility as a special case. To obtain
the certainty equivalent utility, set
e(~ u) =  B (0;V (~ u)):
By the fact that B (0;V (~ u)) is a complete function representation of preferences we obtain
~ u
0  ~ u , e(~ u
0)  e(~ u);
so that we can equivalently write
V (~ u) = f~ u
0 : e(~ u
0)  e(~ u)g:
Finally, notice that Lemma 9.3 implies for ~ u0  ~ u that
e(~ u
0)  e(~ u):
Applying Proposition 10 allows us to demonstrate that when restricted to comparisons
across indierent mean sets, preferences consistent with our axioms are translatable and
radially homothetic:
Proposition 11 Under Axioms A.1 to A.6, whenever  (~ u) =  (~ u0) :
(i) e(~ u)  e(~ u0) ) e(~ u + )  e(~ u0 + );  2 <;
ii) e(~ u)  e(~ u0) ) e(t~ u)  e(t~ u0); t > 0; and
(iii) e(~ u)  e(~ u0) ) e(~ u + (1   )(~ u))  e(~ u0 + (1   )(~ u0)):
To obtain a two-parameter representation of generalized invariant preferences, we rst
dene for given  a risk index as a function of the form:





0 (~ u   
 (~ u)) : p 2 P
g;
where P  is a closed convex set containing the origin. (~ u    (~ u);P ), obviously, is the
support function for P . By the properties of support functions it is lower semi-continuous
and sublinear (positively linearly homogeneous and subadditive) in ~ u  (~ u) and nonegative
(because P  contains the origin). This denition leads to our main representation result.
10Theorem 12 Under Axioms A.1{5, preferences are generalized invariant if and only if there
exists a linear utility function u : X ! R+; a risk index ; and a mapping  : R+R+ ! R+
such that: (i) for ~ u 2 U, e(~ u) = ( (~ u);(~ u    (~ u);P )); (ii)  is increasing in its
rst argument and decreasing in its second, and (iii) ~ u0  ~ u ) ( (~ u0);(~ u0;P )) 
( (~ u);(~ u    (~ u);P )).
A detailed proof of Theorem 12 is contained in an appendix. The argument follows
Quiggin and Chambers (2004), Results 4 and 5. However, the use of a generalized mean
creates some minor technical diculties not encountered in Quiggin and Chambers (2004).
Namely, K (~ u) is not necessarily convex. It is useful, therefore, to summarize the main steps
in the argument, and observe how the extension to generalized invariance is undertaken. It
is obvious that preferences of the form specied by (i) and (ii) satisfy generalized invariance.
For the converse, the argument goes as follows:
By Lemma 9.6,  (~ u) 2 K (~ u), and hence the translated set, K0 (~ u) = K (~ u)  (~ u)~ 1;
contains the origin. Thus, cofK0 (~ u)g; where cofAg is the convex hull of the set A; is a
closed convex set containing the origin which is fully characterized by its sublinear and lower
semi-continuous (in ~ u0) gauge function:
d(~ u
0;cofK0 (~ u)g) = inf ft > 0 : ~ u
0 2 tcofK0 (~ u)gg;
if there is t such that ~ u0 2 tcofK0 (~ u)g and 1 otherwise. Dening
r(~ u   
 (~ u); ~ u
0) = d(~ u   
 (~ u);cofK0 (~ u)g);
then yields a sublinear, nonegative, and lower semi-continuous function of ~ u    (~ u). The
Hahn{Banach theorem thus implies that r(~ u  (~ u); ~ u0) can then always be written in the
form
r(~ u   





0 (~ u   





where P  (~ u0)  RS is a closed convex set that contains the origin. As can be shown,
generalized invariance implies that r(~ u    (~ u); ~ u0) and P  (~ u0) are both homogeneous of
degree minus one in ~ u0 and invariant to translations of ~ u0: Hence, with no true no loss of
generality, by imposing an appropriate normalization, such as the requirement that jjP jj = 1
11(where jj  jj is the Euclidean volume), we may write





0 (~ u   
 (~ u)) : p 2 P
g;
as required.
5 Comparisons of uncertainty aversion and compara-
tive statics
Although Axioms 1{6 imply quite weak restrictions on preferences, much of the standard
comparative static analysis for mean-variance models remains applicable.
5.1 Measures of risk aversion
If for u 2 R
maxf : 0    2 V (u)g =  u;







= u; u 2 R:
Given a generalized invariant preference structure whose certainty equivalent satises the
agreement property and a probability measure , one might dene the uncertainty premium
(for that measure) as the dierence between the mean for that probability measure and the
certainty equivalent
D(~ u;) = 
0~ u   (
 (~ u);(~ u   
 (~ u);P
)):
If  2 
; then






 (~ u);(~ u   
 (~ u);P
));
12and so D(~ u;)  0: Observe that D(~ u;) can be partitioned as follows
D(~ u;) = (
0~ u   
 (~ u)) + R(




R(;) =    (;)
= (;0)   (;)
The components of the decomposition may be interpreted as follows: (0~ u    (~ u)) is
an ambiguity/pessimism premium relative to  2  that emerges from the individual's
conservative evaluation of mean returns; and R(;) measures the eect of shifting from a
riskless situation with mean  to a risky situation with mean  and risk index : Hence,
one can think of it as the risk premium associated with the generalized mean, ; and the
generalized invariant certainty equivalent. If  2 
; then both the ambiguity premium and
the risk premium are positive.
Suppose individuals A and B have generalized invariant preferences and share the same
u; 
; and P : Then dierences in preferences are entirely determined by , which in the
decomposition given above, is taken to reect risk attitudes. So in this case, comparing
uncertainty aversion reduces to comparing risk aversion in the sense described above. Dene:
L(;) = f(^ ; ^ )  (;) : (^ ; ^ )  (;)g;
where the rst inequality is taken in vector terms. L(;) is the set of generalized means
and risk indexes which dominate (;) and for which the increase in the generalized means
from  at least compensates for the associated increase in risk exposure.
We say that A is more risk averse than B if LA (;)  LB (;) for all (;): That
is, A is more risk averse than B if any combination of an increase in mean  and riskiness 
that is acceptable to A is also acceptable to B: Visually, A is more risk averse than B if for
all (;); A0s indierence curve passing through (;) is more steeply sloped than B0s: In
the case where  is smooth, it follows immediately that
L
A (;)  L








1 (;) for all (;):
13This denition of `more risk averse' is consistent with the traditional denition that has
gained currency in the literature on mean-variance preferences. Suppose that preferences can
be expressed in the form v (;2) where, with a slight abuse of notation,  is now understood
to be the mean for a xed probability measure,  is the associated standard deviation, and
v is smooth. Then, taking  as ; according to our terminology, A is more risk averse than


























For mean-variance preferences,  2v2 (;2)=v1 (;2) coincides exactly with Epstein's (1985)
approximation to the Arrow{Pratt risk-aversion measure for general preferences and admits
the interpretation of \...twice the risk premium per unit of variance for a small gamble"
(Epstein, 1985, p.949). Following this terminology, we shall refer to  2 (;)=1 (;) as
the generalized Arrow{Pratt risk aversion measure in what follows.
5.2 Choice problems and comparative statics
Choice problems for individuals with generalized invariant preferences can always be decom-
posed analytically. First isolate an `ecient frontier' and then from that ecient frontier
pick an optimal risk exposure as characterized by : Consider the general choice problem in
which C ()  U is a closed, convex choice set parametrized by  2   RK. An individual




 (~ u);(~ u   
 (~ u);P
)) : ~ u 2 C ()g:
Assume that a well dened solution exists to this problem.










;C ()) = min
~ u
f(~ u   
;P
) : ~ u 2 C ();
 (~ u) = 
g:
Because (~ u   ;P ) is sublinear,  (~ u) is superlinear, and C () is convex, this rst-stage
programming problem can be handled by standard convex programming tools.
14Denote the subdierential of (~ u   ;P ) by @(~ u   ;P ) and that of  (~ u) by
@ (~ u); and note that the properties of support functions guarantee that, respectively,
@(~ u   ;P )  P  and @ (~ u)  
: The convexity of  (a consequence of sublinearity)
and the concavity of  (a consequence of superlinearity) ensure that each possesses a well-
dened one-sided directional derivative so long as they are proper. Denote the one-sided di-
rectional derivative of (~ u    (~ u);P ) in the direction of ~ u0 by d+(~ u    (~ u);P ; ~ u0) and
that of  (~ u) by d+ (~ u; ~ u0) and note that they are, respectively, sublinear and superlinear
and satisfy d+(~ u    (~ u);P ; ~ u0)  p0~ u0 for all p 2 @(~ u   ;P ) and d+ (~ u; ~ u0)  0~ u0
for all  2 @ (~ u)  
: Hence, d+ (~ u; ~ u0) has a natural interpretation as a generalized
mean computed with respect to a subset of 
:
First-order necessary and sucient conditions for a solution, therefore, require for any
small movement in a feasible direction ~ u0 ( (~ u + ~ u0) 2 C ()) that
d+
 






~ u; ~ u
0
 0;






In what follows, we shall assume that C () is regular in the sense that it admits a solution
to this problem.
Once this rst-stage is solved, one can then use ^ (;P ;C ()) to dene ecient frontiers
of the choice set C () as given by, for example,
f(
;) :  = ^ (
;P
;C ())g;
which traces out the minimal risk, as measured by (~ u   ;P ); consistent with the choice
set C () and a generalized mean return of :
^ (;P ;C ()) is common across all individuals with generalized invariant preferences
who share a common u; 
; and P : Thus, for such individuals; where they locate on the
ecient frontier is determined by their risk preferences as characterized by L(;): With a






In the smooth case, the solution to this generalized choice problem is, therefore, characterized










which involves equating the generalized Arrow{Pratt measure of risk aversion to the slope
of the ecient frontier.
On the basis of this formulation of the choice problem and our denition of `more risk
averse', we are led to the general result:
Proposition 13 Suppose individuals A and B share the same u; 
, P ; and C (): If A




















B ()  
A ():
Thus, our denition of `more-risk averse' ensures that, for two individuals sharing the
same  and P and a positive risk{return trade o, the more risk averse of the two will expose
himself or herself to more risk in return for a higher general mean return.
There are several other observations to be drawn from this discussion of the general choice
problem for an individual with generalized invariant preferences. First, and perhaps most
importantly, even in the absence of uniquely dened probability measures or a reliance upon
the standard deviation to measure risk, it is possible to construct simple two-parameter
decision models for generalized invariant preferences that assume a form almost identical
to those that have long been analyzed in mean-variance analysis. Hence, results obtained
in a mean-variance framework, which do not depend critically upon the presumption of
a single probability measure, will translate directly and easily to our framework. Thus,
both the intuition and the analysis of mean-variance analysis is more robust than perhaps
generally thought. Epstein (1985) has shown that a mean-variance preference functional
will characterize rational choice given the assumption of a xed probability measure and
a seemingly innocuous assumption on systematic changes in risk aversion. Here we show
that generalized invariance allows one to extend the general intuition of the mean-variance
framework to decision frameworks where well-dened subjective probabilities may not exist
and where, even if they did, higher-order moments can inuence choice.
16Second, by identifying an ecient frontier, that two-parameter choice problem can always
be collapsed into a single dimensional choice problem that only involves determining the
individual's optimal exposure to `risk' as dened above. Thus, comparative static analysis
for such general choice problems is a relatively simple matter of determining the result of
the interplay between risk attitudes, as characterized by ; and changes in the ecient
frontier in response to changes in : In many interesting instances, therefore, comparative-
static analysis will reduce to determining the supermodularity or submodularity properties
of ^ (;P ;C ()) in (;): A case in point is the standard asset allocation problem.
Example 14 Consider the standard portfolio allocation problem. There are J risky assets
whose (gross) returns are given by ~ Rj, j = 1;:::;J and a riskless asset whose return is given
by (1 + r): Denote the net (excess) return on the jth risky asset by
~ Nj = ~ Rj   (1 + r):
If initial wealth is w; then returns, in monetary units, from investing j percent of initial
wealth to each of the J risky assets is
































where we have used the homogeneity and invariance properties of  and : This asset allo-


































































~ Nj   1;P

!












17Thus, the asset allocation problem in the presence of a riskless asset can be reduced to
one of choosing the mix of holdings between the riskless asset and the holding, 0; of a single
risky derivative asset constructed from the J marketed risky assets with generalized mean













The ecient portfolio for the risky derivative asset with generalized mean normalized to








j ~ Nj   1;P

!








Necessary and sucient conditions for an interior solution to the portfolio-choice problem













j ~ Nj; ~ Nj
!
; j = 1;::;J






















j ~ Nj; ~ Nk
!
for all k and j: In a natural generalization of the mean-variance portfolio problem, the gen-
eralized means of net returns for all the risky assets can be related to one another directly
through the generalized risk measure.
Hence, just as in mean-variance analysis, there is two-fund separation. The ecient
frontier for this two-fund portfolio problem is ane with intercept given by w(1 + r) which
corresponds to the mean return with zero risk and all wealth allocated to the riskless asset.
The slope of the ecient frontier is given by 1
(1): Thus, it follows that in the smooth case, an
individual with generalized invariant preferences chooses his or her generalized mean return
so that
 
2 (w(1 + r) + w0;w0 (1))





More generally, an immediate corollary to Proposition 13 is that more risk averse individuals
will purchase less of the risky derivative asset than less risk averse individuals.
185.3 Monotonicity
In practical applications, one must always be aware that arbitrary choices of (;) can be
problematic and can yield the resulting generalized invariant model inconsistent with our
axioms and with Theorem 12. In particular, arbitrary two-parameter representations may
not display global monotonicity.
The well-known case of Tobin{Markowitz mean-variance preferences illustrates the prob-
lem. To place these preferences within the invariant framework, take 
 = fg and dene
hx;yi as the expectations inner product for this measure , with the corresponding norm
denoted by jxj ; and let x
y represent elementwise division. Then we have, by the properties











2 for all y
o
= fp : p









 jyj for all y
o
;















Now consider the standard Tobin{Markowitz setup:
(









where 2 > 0 is the generalized Arrow{Pratt measure of risk aversion. Then for a small
but arbitrary perturbation of ~ u to ~ u + ~ u0 with  > 0 and ~ u0 2 RS
+; monotonicity requires


























Hence, as the generalized Arrow{Pratt measure of risk aversion gets arbitrarily large, the
domain over which Tobin{Markowitz preferences fail monotonicity grows.
19Taking u0 (s) = 1 and u0 (k) = 0 for all k 2 S; k 6= s expression (1) and the properties of
















for arbitrary s 2 S: Hence, a necessary and sucient condition for monotonicity in the

















The mean-standard deviation model of preferences has proved powerful in a range of contexts,
most notably in the analysis of asset pricing. However, it embodies restrictions that render it
implausible as a model of individual behavior. First, while the mean and standard deviation
are useful concepts in statistics, there is no particular reason why investor preferences over
distributions of returns should be expressed in terms of these two moments alone. Moreover,
there is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that neither the standard deviation nor
the variance successfully capture individual perceptions of risk. Second, like the expected
utility model, the mean-standard deviation model assumes that individuals have well dened
subjective probabilities over events, even though there is signicant empirical and theoretical
evidence that this assumption is not valid in general.
In this paper, it has been shown that both of these assumptions may be relaxed without
a substantial loss of analytical power. The mean may be replaced by a generalized mean
allowing for a range of probabilities, while the standard deviation may be replaced by an
invariant risk index while still generating a tractable representation of asset demand and
sharp comparative static results. This paper also illustrates the powerful role that notions
familiar from standard consumer and producer theory, once provided with a behavioral
foundation, can play in developing tractable analytical models of preferences over uncertain
outcomes.
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228 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7: For x;y;z 2 X with x  y;  (x)   (y) because for constant acts
x =  (x): By A.6, therefore, for  2 (0;1)
x  y , x + (1   )z  y + (1   )z
Symmetrically,
y  x , y + (1   )x  x + (1   )z:
which establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 8: Axioms A.1 and A.2 correspond to Axioms 1 and 2 of Herstein and
Milnor (1953), and Lemma 7 yields their Axiom 3 by taking  = 1
2. Hence the existence of
an ane utility representation follows from Theorem 8 of Herstein and Milnor (1953). Since
X is an unbounded, closed, convex cone with 0 2 X; we can set u(0) = 0 and the result
follows.
Proof of Lemma 9:
1) a) Let ~ u0 = u ~ f0 and ~ u = u ~ f for ~ f; ~ f0 2 F: Then by A:1 and Lemma 8 either ~ u  ~ u0
or ~ u0  ~ u and the conclusion follows from the denition of V: b) is trivial.
2) Closedness follows from Lemma 8 and A:2:
3) By Lemma 8, for x0;x 2 X if u(x0)  u(x); then u(x0)  u(x): Hence, by the rst
part of A:3; for ~ u0; ~ u 2 F; if ~ u0  ~ u; then ~ u0  ~ u; so that ~ u0 2 V (~ u):




 ~ u(~ g). By A:4 for  2 (0;1); ~ f +
(1   ) ~ g  ~ f so that
~ u

















5) Follows by Lemma 8 and A:5:
6) Follows from the denition of  and Lemma 8.




  (~ g)
~ f  ~ g ()  ~ f + (1   )x  ~ g + (1   )x:



























  (~ g); A.3,









+ (1   )u(x)  ~ u(~ g) + (1   )u(x):




; and  = u(x) to obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 10 Note rst that  (t~ u) = t (~ u) for t > 0 and  (~ u + ) =
 (~ u) + : Hence, by Lemma 8  (t~ u)  t (~ u) and  (~ u + )   (~ u) + : Therefore to
establish that for t > 0
K (t~ u) = tK (~ u);
we only need establish that for  (~ u)  (~ u0); ~ u0 2 V (~ u) , t~ u0 2 V (t~ u) for t > 0: That it
follows for t < 1 is immediate from Lemma 9.7 by setting  = 0: For t > 1; dene ~ u = t~ u0












and then take  = 1
t:
That
K (~ u + (1   )
(~ u)) = K (~ u) + (1   )
(~ u)~ 1;
follows from K (t~ u) = tK (~ u) for t > 0 and Lemma 9.7 by taking  = (~ u): That
K (~ u + ) = K (~ u) + ~ 1;  2 <;
follows from the rst two parts of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11 The conditions  (~ u) =  (~ u0);e(~ u)  e(~ u0) ensure K (~ u) 
K (~ u0) and the result now follows from 10 and the denition of the certainty equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 12 With several changes, the proof strategy follows Quiggin and
Chambers (2004).
Suciency: Suppose (~ u) = (~ u0) =  and e(~ u)  e(~ u0): Then, under the stated
hypothesis,
((~ u);(~ u;P




24and hence, since (~ u) = (~ u0) = ; (~ u;P )  (~ u0;P ): Hence, by the agreement property
of  and the translation invariance of (~ u    (~ u);P )
((~ u + ~ 1);(~ u + ~ 1;P
)) = ((~ u) + ;(~ u;P
))
 ((~ u




0 + ~ 1);(~ u
0 + ~ 1;P
))
The argument for radial invariance is similar.
Necessity. The existence and properties of the utility function u and the mean ; have
already been established. The proof of the proposition is in three parts.
First, given generalized invariance, we establish the existence of a risk index  with the
desired properties.
Second, we show that any two of the conditions (~ u) = (~ u0);(~ u;P ) = (~ u0;P ) and
e(~ u) = e(~ u0) implies the third and hence that preferences may be represented in the form
e(~ u) = ((~ u);(~ u;P ))
Third, we show that  has the desired properties
First part: Existence of a risk index We begin with a preliminary claim.
Claim 15 : If preferences are generalized invariant, for ~ u 6=  (~ u), then, for any ~ u0 there
is an index r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0) that is nonnegative, lower semicontinuous and sublinear in
~ u    (~ u); and that satises
r
 
~ u   





~ u   
 (~ u);~ u
0
;
for  2 R;and
r
 
~ u   










for  > 0: Further, if e(~ u0) = e(~ u1); (~ u0) =  (~ u1); then, for all ~ u
r
 
~ u   




~ u   
 (~ u);~ u
1
Proof of Claim 15: Consider the gauge function of the closed convex set A dened by
d(~ u;A) = inf ft > 0 : ~ u 2 tAg;
25if there is a t such that ~ u 2 tA; and 1 otherwise. d is positively linearly homogeneous
and subadditive (sublinear) in ~ u (Aliprantis and Border [2, Lemma 5.36]). It is lower semi-
continuous in ~ u if and only if A contains zero (Aliprantis and Border [2, Theorem 5.39]).
Moreover,




~ u   

















By Lemma 9, K (~ u0)    (~ u0)~ 1 is a closed convex set that contains the origin. Moreover,



















~ u   















is the gauge function for a closed convex set containing the origin. Hence, it is nonnegative,
and lower semicontinuous and sublinear in ~ u    (~ u) as required.
That r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0 + ) = r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0) for  2 R follows from the denition of
r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0) and the agreement property of generalized means. For  > 0;
r
 
~ u   











































~ u   
 (~ u);~ u
0
;
where the second equality follows by the sublinearity of ; the third equality by generalized
radial invariance:
By the fact that: r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0) is lower semicontinuous and sublinear in ~ u    (~ u),
it can always be written in the form (e.g., Aubin and Ekeland, Theorem 1.5.8, p. 30)
r
 
~ u   






0 (~ u   





26where the fact that r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0) is nonnegative implies P (~ u0) is a closed convex set that







~ u   
 (~ u) : p
0 (~ u   
 (~ u))  r
 
~ u   
 (~ u);~ u
0	
:































The analysis above shows that  has the desired properties.
Second part: Representation by  Suppose e(~ u) = e(~ u0); then




0)  e(~ u):
The rst inequality can only be true if V (~ u)  V (~ u0); and the second can only be true
if V (~ u0)  V (~ u); whence V (~ u0) = V (~ u): Also suppose that  (~ u) =  (~ u0) = ; then
K (~ u) = K (~ u0); and generalized translation invariance implies K (~ u0   ) = K (~ u   ):
Thus,
~ u     ~ u
0   ;
Generalized radial invariance implies
~ u   
r(~ u0   ;~ u0)

~ u0   










~ u   





27and thus by sublinearity
r
 





0   ;~ u
0
:
Suppose e(~ u) = e(~ u0) and r(~ u    (~ u); ~ u0) = r
 
~ u0    (~ u)
0 ;~ u0
; then it must be true
that
~ u    (~ u)
r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0)

~ u0    (~ u0)







and generalized radial invariance implies that
~ u   




which can only be true when e(~ u) = e(~ u0) if  (~ u) =  (~ u0):
Now suppose that r(~ u    (~ u); ~ u0) = r(~ u0    (~ u0);~ u0) and  (~ u) =  (~ u0): Because
r(~ u    (~ u); ~ u0) = r(~ u0    (~ u0);~ u0); it must true that
~ u    (~ u)
r(~ u    (~ u);~ u0)

~ u0    (~ u0)







and generalized radial invariance implies
~ u   




When  (~ u) =  (~ u0); generalized translation invariance implies
~ u  ~ u
0;
whence e(~ u) = e(~ u0): Hence e may be written in the form
e(~ u) = (




Third part: Properties of 
It remains to be shown that  is increasing in its rst argument and decreasing in its
second. Suppose  (~ u) =  (~ u0) = ; then e(~ u)  e(~ u0) if and only if K (~ u)  K (~ u0). By
generalized translation invariance, then e(~ u)  e(~ u0) only if ~ u    2 K (~ u0   ); whence
r(~ u   ;~ u
0)  1: (3)
28By denition
~ u   
r(~ u   ;~ u0)
 ~ u
0   ;
and generalized radial invariance implies that
~ u   
r(~ u   ;~ u0)r(~ u0   ;~ u0)

~ u0   









Thus, by the properties of gauge functions
r

~ u   





from which sublinearity yields
r
 
~ u   ;u
0




0   ;~ u
0
;
which with (3) gives
r
 





0   ;~ u
0
:
This establishes that if  (~ u) =  (~ u0); then










0   ;~ u
0
 0:
For  > 0; the agreement property of the generalized means and Lemma 9.3 imply that
e
 





 (~ u) + ;sup
p
fp
0 (~ u   










0 (~ u   




which establishes that  is nondecreasing in it rst argument. Finally, Lemma 9.3 requires
that ~ u0  ~ u ) ( (~ u0);(~ u0    (~ u0);P ))  ( (~ u);(~ u    (~ u);P )):
Proof of 13 Consider any (^ ; ^ ) 2 LA  
B ();B ()

; where B () denotes the optimal
risk exposure for B: Thus, we consider any increase in risk and return, relative to the optimum













so (^ ; ^ ) 2 LB  
B ();B ()





for B implies that either
^  = B (); ^  = B () or(^ ; ^ ) = 2 C ():
Hence, A ()  B (); A ()  B () as required.
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